Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Moonwell Lending
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 45 → 45 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464366467
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T04:47:51.776Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T04:48:25.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T04:48:25.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Bx4AX3qeW9QZStuvGTiH12cFFJr3sBxUg47kjxXUR2fT
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1889 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b1ec85bd2fb9e4c114d2b1d8421e25b0","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:47:51.538Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"a9f1ce8e-0b15-4a1f-a9d0-6d8f5544dbf7","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":45,"page_slug":"moonwell-lending","prev_score":45,"reason":"The Nov 2025 and Feb 2026 incident figures check out against sources (claim_findings[2], [6]). The page is out of date, though. It leaves out the August 2026 MAMO exploit (about $8.7M) and the resulting borrowing freeze on Base, and it still says Moonwell 'continues to operate' as of early 2026 (claim_findings[0], omission_findings[0], subject_status). Other claims are weaker than stated. The Claude co-authorship is reported as unverified (claim_findings[3]), the Moonriver governance attack date and the 66.7% vote figure are unsupported (claim_findings[4], [5]), and the 'five incidents' tally omits the latest one (claim_findings[1]). The reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.6) and only a sample of sources was fetched, so the penalty sits in the middle of the band and the page is not denied.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a critical omission (the 27 Aug 2026 MAMO market exploit of about $8.7M and the freeze on new Base borrowing) and finds that the page's 'continues to operate' status contradicts it. The claim percentage alone (25% unverifiable, 37.5% if the stale finding is counted) understates this, so the page is judged in the significant band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}