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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · YieldBlox Stellar Oracle Manipulation Exploit (Feb 2026)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
4 → 0 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
425399883
Off-chain at
2026-06-09T20:26:15.542Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
6KuEbc13o8KY3JFRTv4gBrZjarSBdkZya1yDZrqnNu7K
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1365 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:26:15.234Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"c780cc5c-8e20-48dc-b8e2-438bd56cd9d3","new_score":0,"page_slug":"yieldblox-stellar-oracle-manipulation-exploit-feb-2026","prev_score":4,"reason":"The page's core forensic claims are well-supported: exploit mechanics, transaction hashes, attacker addresses, validator freeze figures, and audit details are all confirmed by multiple independent Tier 1 sources (Rekt News, BlockSec, Halborn, QuillAudits). One claim is disputed — claim_findings[32] misattributes a '$400 million in DeFi losses through mid-2026' total to a CCN article that actually headlines '$1 billion+', a factual mischaracterization of the cited source. An internal inconsistency also exists: claim_findings[22] states $6.7 million in XLM remaining in attacker addresses, while claim_findings[24] correctly cites $7.2–7.5 million — one of these figures must be corrected. Two high-priority coverage gaps (law enforcement response given the Binance KYC trail, and confirmation of actual depositor compensation execution) represent material omissions given the June 2026 review date. The page otherwise merits high confidence in its factual foundation.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}