Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
publish · Polter Finance
- Sequence
- #1
- Score
- →
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 420910754
- Off-chain at
- 2026-05-20T04:09:18.986Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6mYdyNXWMnXZYYc7JPeVFUbBbLJqHLoGr5JGMczNcr7n
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (4542 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"97695430-7780-46fe-8666-3ea820e2f317","kind":"publish","page_slug":"polter-finance","published_at":"2026-05-20T04:09:18.931Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Polter Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://threesigma.xyz/blog/exploit/polter-finance-exploit-explained-usd12m-loss"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://rekt.news/polter-finance-rekt"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://polter.gitbook.io/polter/security/audit"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://threesigma.xyz/blog/exploit/polter-finance-exploit-explained-usd12m-loss"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.certik.com/blog/polter-finance-incident-analysis"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-polter-finance-hack-november-2024"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/polter-finance-12m-hack-analysis"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.certik.com/blog/polter-finance-incident-analysis"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://threesigma.xyz/blog/exploit/polter-finance-exploit-explained-usd12m-loss"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://rekt.news/polter-finance-rekt"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://decrypt.co/292080/crypto-lender-polter-finance-hack-drains-funds"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://crypto.news/polter-finance-kicks-off-recovery-efforts-following-12m-flash-loan-attack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.certik.com/blog/polter-finance-incident-analysis"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://threesigma.xyz/blog/exploit/polter-finance-exploit-explained-usd12m-loss"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-polter-finance-hack-november-2024"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://rekt.news/polter-finance-rekt"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.auditone.io/blog-posts/the-12m-polter-finance-hack-a-comprehensive-analysis"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Polter Finance was a decentralized lending protocol on the Fantom blockchain that suffered a critical oracle price manipulation exploit on November 16, 2024, resulting in losses estimated between $8.7 million and $12 million. The protocol was an unaudited fork of Geist Finance that relied on spot prices from SpookySwap liquidity pools as its oracle, a fundamental design flaw that allowed an attacker using funds originating from Tornado Cash to drain nearly all protocol TVL. The platform ceased operations following the hack, with no confirmed recovery of stolen assets as of mid-2026.","timeline":[{"date":"2024-11-16","event":"Attacker, using funds sourced from Tornado Cash on Ethereum bridged to Fantom, exploits the BOO lending market oracle via flash loan price manipulation, draining an estimated $8.7M–$12M from Polter Finance.","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-17","event":"Polter Finance pauses platform, issues public disclosure on X, notifies bridge operators, and traces alleged fund movement to Binance wallets.","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-17","event":"Pseudonymous founder Whichghost files a police report with Singapore authorities via Singpass, recording losses of SGD 16.1M (~$12M USD).","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-17","event":"Polter Finance sends on-chain message to exploiter offering no-prosecution negotiation; attacker does not respond.","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-18","event":"Polter Finance announces partnership with SEAL-ISAC to assist in attacker identification and fund tracing.","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-18","event":"On-chain forensics confirm attacker split ~10M FTM across 11 wallets, bridged to Ethereum via SquidRouter/Li.fi, and laundered at least 220 ETH through Tornado Cash.","source":""},{"date":"2024-11-20","event":"Polter Finance ceases operations. No user compensation mechanism is announced. Protocol remains offline.","source":""}]},"v":1}