Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · LayerZero Protocol
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 42 → 55 (+13)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514889
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:16:19.418Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- G5mdLkU2JooENSP5CZU5jaFarSZgtoZHveuFdn25cziP
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1808 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:19.307Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"ae4c060a-cd45-41d5-8a93-fd8e8e6ac8d9","new_score":55,"page_slug":"layerzero-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration review, not a fact-dispute review. The page content stands: all six claim_findings are marked supported with 0% disputed. The calibration reviewer (confidence 0.88) finds the current score of 42 (WARNING band) over-penalizes a legitimate, institutionally-backed infrastructure operator. The $292M KelpDAO exploit (claim_findings[0]) was carried out by North Korea's Lazarus Group (TraderTraitor/UNC4899) via a nation-state-level social engineering attack on LayerZero's off-chain DVN infrastructure — an external advanced persistent threat. LayerZero acknowledged negligence in permitting a 1-of-1 DVN configuration (claim_findings[1]) and has taken substantive corrective action: public apology, security defaults upgraded to 5-of-5 DVN, full incident report co-authored with Mandiant and CrowdStrike, and infrastructure rebuilt (claim_findings[2]). Continued institutional backing from Sequoia, a16z, Citadel Securities, DTCC, and ICE confirms legitimate operator status (claim_findings[3]). The WARNING band (20–49) is reserved for unresolved severe incidents; this incident is substantively resolved operationally. A score of 55 in the CAUTIONARY band appropriately reflects real residual risk — significant client exodus, demonstrated off-chain infrastructure concentration risk, ZRO token ~89% below peak — without equating the protocol to fraud risk. The +13 delta moves the score from 42 to 55 as recommended.","score_delta":13,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}