Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Coldcard Firmware Vulnerability (Standalone Investigation)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 20 → 12 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462186555
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:19:13.242Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:19:39.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:19:39.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7NHaAEWWHRJyJDdwMNywRQ5CfYSM7cGCkPJuwynm4FHK
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1623 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"c73b5b81eaa9534a22b21749a8a7e06d","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:19:12.864Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"2e8494c6-57c9-4f11-b28f-f16c12c1151e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":12,"page_slug":"coldcard-firmware-vulnerability-standalone-investigation","prev_score":20,"reason":"Of 9 claim findings, one was excluded because its source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[6]). Of the remaining 8, one was disputed and one could not be verified, which gives 25% and the minor-issues band. The disputed item, claim_findings[0], is a timeline date: the 5.6.1 / 1.5.1Q release is listed as 2026-08-01 but the Coinkite post and the page's own 'three weeks later' text point to about 2026-08-20. The unverified item, claim_findings[5], is the 'double SHA-256 mixing' detail, which the reviewer did not find in the source. claim_findings[3] also notes the page treats a BIP-39 passphrase as an equal mitigation where Coinkite recommends migration regardless. The core exploit narrative, affected versions and loss figures are consistent with the sources, the subject status does not contradict the page, and the omissions are minor, so the penalty is kept at the low end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-8,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}