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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443519829
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T09:04:16.478Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
5S2x7THskY66j6qjnDqGJmQEr51eM1pvRDRMWcEPrR7z
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1849 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T09:04:16.141Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"74c733a8-1c2a-4192-a238-a140c772db61","new_score":0,"page_slug":"coldcard-fake-hardware-audit-phishing-campaign","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative is well supported: 25 of 31 checked claims are confirmed outright, several by independent Tier 1 reporting the page did not even cite, giving a disputed rate of roughly 3% under the review's own formula. One claim, however, was found disputed in a way that matters more than its count suggests: the page's guidance section tells readers that no phishing domain names or malicious download locations were ever published, but a contemporaneous security outlet in fact published a specific cloned domain, a spoofed sender address, and a command-and-control domain (claim_findings[22]). Because this sits in the page's own 'what to check against' guidance, it leaves readers believing no such checklist exists rather than simply not giving it to them, which the review flagged as a high-priority gap (coverage_gaps[0]) — a signal that calls for revision even though the overall dispute rate is low. A handful of smaller, already-supported claims were also found imprecise rather than wrong (an entropy figure that quotes the loosest bound in its source, a firmware date off by about two weeks, a warning attributed to two companies but confirmed for one), none of which touch the incident's core facts. Coinkite and Coldcard are consistently and correctly framed as impersonated victims, with the separate email-retention criticism kept apart from the phishing itself, and the safety guidance elsewhere on the page does not contradict itself.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}