Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · H2 2026 July Bridge Hack Wave — Seven Attacks, $M+ Lost
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506016
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-08T04:39:02.715Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DzRv7x3xBB4JuuYwFTeYk1n3uTfDki69ebtVoMb9EdWB
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1731 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-08T04:39:02.548Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"3e006894-1e8f-4d75-9ffa-6a43c96da138","new_score":0,"page_slug":"h2-2026-july-bridge-hack-wave-seven-attacks-m-lost","prev_score":0,"reason":"22 claims were checked; 14 are fully confirmed, 6 are partially supported, 1 is unverifiable, and 1 is disputed. The computed disputed_pct is 9%, which falls in the 0–10% approve band. The single disputed item (claim_findings[20]) is an internal structural inconsistency — the Systemic Analysis section labels nine enumerated attacks as 'seven core incidents' — which is an editorial error, not a factual misrepresentation of external events. The most material accuracy concern is the temporally misleading framing of the $328.6M YTD bridge loss figure (claim_findings[2]), which originates from mid-May 2026 PeckShield data but is presented as a July year-to-date total; however, the 'at least' qualifier and the July source's own 'earlier in the year' language partially mitigate this. Core incident data — amounts, dates, attack vectors, and technical mechanics across all seven attacks — is confirmed by multiple Tier-1 sources including CoinDesk, The Block, and CoinTelegraph, with security-firm post-mortems from Halborn and BlockSec providing technical corroboration. Two high-priority coverage gaps are noted (absence of on-chain transaction evidence and unresolved white-hat bounty outcomes, including the Wanchain August 6 deadline that has now passed) but coverage gaps alone do not warrant denial or revision under current policy.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}