Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 38 → 38 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457977551
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T08:54:17.710Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T08:54:43.654Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5FEmtSk4ReFoJkpmEDdAaCMwtaC2kyij2vDphHQy4JUo
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2510 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"07059739e840ad2b3a38a0a359636db4","decided_at":"2026-10-17T08:54:17.576Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2581,"findings_hash":"63EkNsENYc1oWhWSjifZwx2eJrWdfhCFgNVCYTypLTAi","investigation_id":"1b36e032-1618-4172-a80f-e475afaaf1a7","mode":"findings_only","new_score":38,"page_content_hash":"c8354ea0c04dab2a42509a185adb8f8b577eeb3bef7156dd99f375a398d82a86","page_slug":"stakedao-vsdcrv-deployer-key-exploit-may-2026","prev_score":38,"reason":"The core narrative of this page — a compromised StakeDAO deployer key with un-rotated owner privileges on the vsdCRV LayerZero OFT contract, a 25-second forged mint of ~5.44 trillion vsdCRV on Arbitrum on May 27, 2026, a ~43.78 ETH (~$91,000) realized gain laundered via Tornado Cash, and the subsequent SDGP-70 compensation proposal and Swiss criminal complaint — is well-corroborated by multiple independent news outlets and the StakeDAO governance forum itself, including exact figures like the 5,446,744,073,709 token mint, the deployer and attacker wallet addresses, the 47-minute backing-rescue window, and the SDGP-70 sdCRV funding breakdown. Two issues stand out: first, the page states the ~43.78 ETH 'remained untouched on Ethereum mainnet' as of the June 9, 2026 post-mortem date, which directly contradicts the page's own adjacent sentence and timeline entry showing the funds were moved into Tornado Cash on May 31, 2026 — a clear internal and source-level contradiction. Second, the governance proposal SDGP-70 that the page cites is itself internally inconsistent about the number of affected addresses (294 in its operative clause vs. 242 in its summary), and the page silently adopts one figure without flagging the ambiguity; this same unresolved number recurs in the summary, a section, and a timeline entry. A handful of granular figures (16.83M vsdCRV swapped, SDT's 6.6-7% price decline and >400% volume spike, the asdCRV 'sunset mode' terminology, Curve's specific withdrawal recommendation, and the exact $770M 2026 DeFi-loss figure attributed to the cited Phemex article, which actually states $750M) could not be verified from the accessible text of the cited sources, though none were contradicted by better evidence. Coverage gaps include the complete absence of primary on-chain verification links and any discussion of post-August 2026 developments.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}