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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · MultiversX (EGLD)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
31 → 31 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462187382
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T19:22:02.914Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T19:22:34.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T19:22:34.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AMscoSkUGMorFLSLukHyRxT3ZHW5SpnuaKX47Cgmqix1
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1817 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"89559bb14197a6215e9c010e883c3ba1","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:22:02.582Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2308,"investigation_id":"1ed0417b-43c3-4515-83ee-e082fefff6be","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":31,"page_slug":"multiversx-egld","prev_score":31,"reason":"Of 12 checked claims, 1 was disputed and 2 could not be verified (25%), which puts the page in the minor-issues band. The disputed item is the 'Bridge Exploit' heading for 2022, which the page's own body describes as a Maiar DEX exploit (claim_findings[10]). The User Protection Fund attribution to ETHNews and the executeOnDestContextByCaller attribution to CryptoTicker do not appear in the cited articles (claim_findings[5], [9]). The core timeline, exchange actions and price figures are confirmed by Tier 2 sources. The page is also stale because the Upbit review window has passed (omission_findings[0]), and three high-priority coverage gaps remain open, so the page needs revision rather than approval.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The material omission (omission_findings[0]) is that the Upbit Oct 19-23 review window has passed and the page still shows it as upcoming. The page dates itself as of Oct 4 and says the outcome was pending, and the reviewer found no reported outcome. No shutdown, exploit or sanction is left out (subject_status.contradicts_page is false), so the minor band already covers it."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}