Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · MultiversX (EGLD)
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 31 → 31 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462187382
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:22:02.914Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:22:34.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:22:34.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AMscoSkUGMorFLSLukHyRxT3ZHW5SpnuaKX47Cgmqix1
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1817 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"89559bb14197a6215e9c010e883c3ba1","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:22:02.582Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2308,"investigation_id":"1ed0417b-43c3-4515-83ee-e082fefff6be","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":31,"page_slug":"multiversx-egld","prev_score":31,"reason":"Of 12 checked claims, 1 was disputed and 2 could not be verified (25%), which puts the page in the minor-issues band. The disputed item is the 'Bridge Exploit' heading for 2022, which the page's own body describes as a Maiar DEX exploit (claim_findings[10]). The User Protection Fund attribution to ETHNews and the executeOnDestContextByCaller attribution to CryptoTicker do not appear in the cited articles (claim_findings[5], [9]). The core timeline, exchange actions and price figures are confirmed by Tier 2 sources. The page is also stale because the Upbit review window has passed (omission_findings[0]), and three high-priority coverage gaps remain open, so the page needs revision rather than approval.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The material omission (omission_findings[0]) is that the Upbit Oct 19-23 review window has passed and the page still shows it as upcoming. The page dates itself as of Oct 4 and says the outcome was pending, and the reviewer found no reported outcome. No shutdown, exploit or sanction is left out (subject_status.contradicts_page is false), so the minor band already covers it."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}