Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Bitget Exchange — September 2026 Backend Hack ($387.5M)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 30 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 461970872
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T06:34:49.780Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T06:35:10.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T06:35:10.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 81jkJoMy7i3RsVemFdyoiRbQy7Y6JjpEadJAkT4iSEmc
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1960 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"312e9989ee1a1389ff21f0301a047840","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:34:46.274Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.0833,"investigation_id":"f148389b-fbdf-4f1b-9c26-b291f88ef903","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":30,"page_slug":"bitget-exchange-september-2026-backend-hack-387-5m","prev_score":38,"reason":"The core account holds up: the $351.6M to $387.5M revision, the backend spoofing method, the $464M protection fund, the NEAR Intents and stablecoin freezes, and the phased reopening are all corroborated (claim_findings[0,1,4,7,9,10]). By the claim count, only 1 of 12 findings (8.3%) is unverifiable, the '19 unauthorized withdrawals' figure (claim_findings[3]), and none are disputed. However, the page leaves out about $463 million in net customer outflows after withdrawals reopened (omission_findings[1], material). It also states Bitget's cold-wallet claim as fact despite a conflicting on-chain analysis (claim_findings[2]), uses an inexact THORChain quotation (claim_findings[8]), and has a CoinCentral archive link pointing to an unrelated article (claim_findings[11]). These justify a minor penalty and a correction pass, not a status change.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"approve","reason":"Only 1 of 12 claim findings is unverifiable and none are disputed (8.3%, approve band), but omission_findings[1] is material: about $463 million in net customer outflows after withdrawals reopened is missing from the page, and it bears on customer confidence. Four further claims are only partially supported. Escalated one band to minor."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}