Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · NEAR Protocol
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 64 → 52 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462905058
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-29T13:53:48.759Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-29T13:54:00.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-29T13:54:00.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- D7qXpKpegLhGon4C2rF3GMjdY6dtmZYmyznmLknCcZeH
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2061 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"c1dfd4de3a85e4ab4c3572a0ea0bcd7e","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T13:53:48.349Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1429,"investigation_id":"5dfc3991-d810-433a-868c-cc8880f85b96","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"page_slug":"near-protocol","prev_score":64,"reason":"Most checked claims hold up: the October 1, 2026 NEAR Intents breach, the SEC/Coinbase dismissal date, NEAR's inclusion in the 2023 complaint and the Nightshade 2.0 date were confirmed or largely supported (claim_findings[0], [3], [4], [5]). The page does not say that the roughly $3.8M stolen from NEAR Intents was returned in full on October 3, 2026, so it reads as an unresolved loss (omission_findings[0]; claim_findings[0]). Two citations for the Bitwise ETF launch point to a 2025 filing article that does not support the launch (claim_findings[1], [2]), and one shard-count claim could not be verified (claim_findings[6]). The page is revised and carries a minor-issues penalty.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-12,"score_limit":{"applied":-12,"limited":true,"proposed":-15,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-12},"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"minor","reason":"Claim findings alone give about 14% (1 unverifiable of 7 countable, 0 disputed; one source_blocked finding excluded), which is the minor band. The material omission in omission_findings[0] and subject_status.contradicts_page both point to the same stale NEAR Intents account, so the page is held at the top of the minor band (-15). It is not pushed to significant because the omission is a missing update rather than a false claim, the protocol itself is operating, and reviewer confidence is only 0.55."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}