Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Bits of Gold
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 56 → 56 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457975032
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T08:45:31.260Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T08:45:38.514Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3hbNXEbMnFVuri76kLQoWKRa5aLKPKe5Wya3mJjCiL7p
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1892 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"59a09dc0d40116c542df5ee75a9cce20","decided_at":"2026-10-17T08:45:31.106Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1786,"findings_hash":"Fmduuc7o84X5Zxh8195XkG9WvPjSDh6Pihk7gZkmFQfX","investigation_id":"f6ef462c-3310-40dd-b49b-601f0a2b73b4","mode":"findings_only","new_score":56,"page_content_hash":"65bb437d95d670c061053e8add8462babbe34a7e55cae75629255482f4bde17b","page_slug":"bits-of-gold","prev_score":56,"reason":"The page's core narrative — the August 2026 third-party vendor breach via the Metabase CVE-2026-72898 zero-day, affecting roughly 200,000 Bits of Gold customers, with funds and private keys unaffected — is well supported by multiple independent, credible sources and is reported with appropriate hedging where outlets disagree (e.g., the 200K vs 250K customer count). Company background facts (founding, licensing, BILS stablecoin) are also largely solid. The clearest defects are: a mischaracterized court (the 2017 adverse ruling came from a Tel Aviv District Court, not the Supreme Court, repeated in both a section and the timeline), a timeline entry that incorrectly implies CISA added the CVE to its KEV catalog on the same day Metabase disclosed it (actually five days later), an incorrect title for co-founder Jonathan Rouach (the page's own cited source calls him Chairman, not Director), and an unsupported SOC 2 Type 2 certification claim with no backing in any cited or found source. A secondary, lower-severity issue is that the specific Metabase-scanning statistics (11,000 instances, 4,309 vulnerable, 97% unpatched) are accurate but untraceable to any of the four sources cited for that section. None of these defects undermine the page's central claims about the breach itself.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}