Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Juicebox V3
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 48 → 40 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424043684
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-03T14:21:07.476Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- J7PhxdWvDpyJ6fZikHcWHuZ6dhFhSsgQYDB6i1jA1KqK
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1397 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-03T14:21:06.968Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"aa4a488c-c321-4985-82b4-91bf919259f1","new_score":40,"page_slug":"juicebox-v3","prev_score":48,"reason":"The page's historical record is largely accurate — 13 of 20 claims are confirmed by Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. However, claim_findings[2] and claim_findings[14] both overstate the severity of the V3.1.2 fee accounting bug as 'critical' when official Juicebox documentation (Tier 1) classifies it as medium severity with only ~0.006 ETH of actual financial impact. claim_findings[12] (V3 pre-deployment audit roster) is only partially supportable: the CertiK audit cited belongs to V2, the Code4rena audit ran after V3 deployed, and no PeckShield V3 audit was found. The two unverifiable claims (claim_findings[3] and claim_findings[15]) both concern the April 2026 $52,000 exploit, which lacks any corroborating source beyond an inaccessible DeFiLlama entry — this is the most recent and risk-relevant event on the page. Additionally, all seven structured section bodies are empty, meaning the investigation's substantive content is confined to the summary and timeline; this structural gap prevents a full factual review and should be resolved.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}