Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443517176
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T19:48:06.065Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DpypvF2cHsa7bHibJmpaJHNav5BzWDvMKfxNLfPLvtRq
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1391 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T19:48:05.954Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"4feace03-6746-48e9-a625-9cd1ac6e6351","new_score":18,"page_slug":"summer-finance-summer-fi-lazy-summer-protocol-flash-loan-exploit-and-shutdown","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's core factual claims — the exploit mechanism, dollar amounts, timeline, root-cause characterization, shutdown announcement, and current no-compensation/no-recovery status — are well supported by both the official Summer.fi post-mortem and independent tier-1/tier-2 press, and remain current as of 2026-08-25. The page correctly distinguishes the external, premeditated nature of the attack from the separate (and distinct) insider-misappropriation issue at Stream Finance, without conflating the two entities. Issues found are minor: one factual inversion (the Guardian multisig is documented as a 6-of-8 threshold, not '8-of-6' as stated), one misattribution of a premeditation finding to Verichains' research when it appears to originate from Summer.fi's own post-mortem, and one broader-context statistic (121 hacks/$942M for 2026) that was accurate as a mid-year snapshot but is presented without a cutoff and has since been superseded by higher cumulative totals.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}