Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Rhea Lend
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 58 → 58 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464298844
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:46:25.592Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:46:52.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:46:52.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7nzXD966SXBvVwGsq2PnEJHp3HMHn53JAJUJ6QZABe4K
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1898 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"12d2f00aeac8c16dfcecd8aa931fc4d1","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:46:25.343Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4444,"investigation_id":"9b3955d1-a1de-427d-bfb0-14671152301d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":58,"page_slug":"rhea-lend","prev_score":58,"reason":"Of the 9 claims the reviewer could check, 4 (44%) were disputed or could not be verified, which falls in the significant-issues band. The core exploit narrative (April 16, 2026 date, $18.4M loss revised from $7.6M, April 13-15 preparation) is confirmed, but claim_findings[2] disputes the attribution of the flaw's discovery to Halborn, and claim_findings[6] and [7] find no source for a BlockSec April 2025 audit of the exploited code, which the page states as fact while hedging elsewhere. The page also omits that lending was paused after the exploit (omission_findings[0]), and has a high-priority gap on status after May 2026. One TVL claim was not checked because the source blocked the reviewer and is not counted. Reviewer confidence is moderate (0.6) and the core incident is sound, so the penalty is set mid-band and the page is not denied.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":9,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"omission_findings[0] is material: the page does not say Rhea paused its lending contracts after the exploit or that the flaw was in Rhea Lend rather than Rhea DEX, and the page's status is out of date. This keeps the verdict in the significant band rather than a lower one."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}