Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Curve Finance
- Sequence
- #10
- Score
- 63 → 63 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464292608
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:24:27.886Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:24:35.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:24:35.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- A8n8kjQw3v3CY7nYvkRorhHE9x6iSiUoYk2fMqMLEgT4
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1881 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"de56e5832519b5e5a2cccf67cb3bc9a0","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:24:27.645Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3636,"investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":63,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":63,"reason":"Of 11 scored claim findings (one blocked source excluded), 3 were disputed and 1 could not be found, giving about 36%, which falls in the significant-issues band. The three disputed findings (claim_findings[1], [2], [3]) are one error repeated: the 10% bounty deadline is given as August 4 but the cited sources say 08:00 UTC August 6. Several other claims are only partly supported (claim_findings[5], [6], [7], [8]), including a TechCrunch attribution the article does not make, inconsistent bad-debt figures, and a December 2024 liquidation under $1M framed as a repeat of the $140M event. The page also omits the UwU Lend context for the June 2024 liquidation. The core narrative (Vyper reentrancy exploit, roughly 73% recovery, DNS hijack) was confirmed, so the penalty sits at the lower end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":10,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission: the page presents the June 2024 liquidation purely as a CRV price decline and leaves out the UwU Lend exploit context that Cointelegraph and Egorov both tie to it. This confirms the significant band already implied by the percentage rather than moving it."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}