Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · LeadBlock's Morpho Blue Market
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 48 → 38 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423927830
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-03T01:32:44.864Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ECrkQrz1GF7kEFbfZrU1G2QdNP78a5Qq4BkZWuwfFw22
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1354 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-03T01:32:44.689Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"0d100113-16a1-4e26-89b0-e41049bbd95e","new_score":38,"page_slug":"leadblocks-morpho-blue-market","prev_score":48,"reason":"The core facts of the October 13, 2024 oracle exploit — amounts, attacker address, root cause — are well-supported, and no claim was found to directly contradict a higher-tier source. However, three narrative-level mischaracterizations require correction: claim_findings[7] presents LeadBlock's claim of full repayment as an uncontested fact when community member PGov raised on-chain transaction evidence on the same forum thread showing approximately $113,000 in residual outstanding debt; claim_findings[9] frames Morpho's risk warnings system as a post-incident response when the referenced blog post was published May 2, 2024 — five months before the exploit; and claim_findings[8] incorrectly attributes the same publication date (October 18) to three post-mortems when QuillAudits and SolidityScan published in November 2024. Two high-priority coverage gaps — the repayment dispute and absence of on-chain transaction citations — further support revision rather than approval.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}