Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Loopring DEX Shutdown (June 2026)
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 38 → 38 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443526138
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T15:05:27.243Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5DtS9b9gUi1Jd1GgPhgZ4ZfTS31mcw7xWdoSAvJE7JkM
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1162 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T15:05:27.064Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"a9a7a1bb-b9d5-47b9-8247-6afdaee77e40","new_score":38,"page_slug":"loopring-dex-shutdown-june-2026","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page's core, highest-stakes claims — the June 28, 2026 shutdown date, the smart-contract upgrade disabling the trustless exit in favor of a whitelisted-address batch distribution, the $10 minimum-balance exclusion, the two-week discrepancy window, and the June 2024 Guardian hack details — are all well corroborated by multiple independent outlets and, where fetched directly, by the cited sources themselves. Weaknesses are concentrated in secondary details: a technically inaccurate characterization of StarkNet as a native zkEVM, an apparent one-month date error on the BYDFi ST Warning, imprecise first-of-month timeline dates, and a lack of any reporting on whether the announced fund-distribution process actually completed in the two months since the page's most recent sourced claim.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}