Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · BonkDAO Treasury Governance Attack
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 3 → 3 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521292
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T14:19:29.735Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4LhszpWDBfgmPwxVxPCQvKknWwZHwVYQUeojhUiEVN8L
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1575 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T14:19:29.435Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"3c1969e1-ee54-409a-a92b-1b829b3d76c6","new_score":3,"page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack","prev_score":3,"reason":"The page's core factual narrative — date, dollar figures, proposal identifier, vote mechanics, and the 'governance design failure, not a code bug' framing — is well corroborated by independent tier-1 and tier-2 sources. The main defects found are: an unsupported historical superlative that is directly contradicted by one of the page's own cited sources; an internally inconsistent price-decline figure that conflates an hours-scale move with a cumulative multi-day decline; an overstated three-part causal attribution to a single security-firm source that on inspection supports only two of the three legs; and a flattening of a specific, named public legal dispute (Schwartz vs. Ogle) that is present in the page's own cited source but not surfaced. The page is a near-certain duplicate of a separately-published investigation covering the same event, and the two accounts diverge on the magnitude/timing of the price crash and on whether a MarginFi loan financed the attack — differences a reader would notice if they consulted both pages. Both pages omit the same outcome/remediation material (the 'BONK 2.0' multisig identity, ongoing recovery/legal efforts, and ENS DAO's governance reform response).","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}