Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Deguard
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 55 → 51 (-4)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464245396
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-01T21:35:34.376Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-01T21:36:03.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-01T21:36:03.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GjSgjiPQufSYE6THp1MBmjGL8oqGoFTmQHGTXFvuPaeF
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1666 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"bd6dc340ce75f40d0f1461f28fd7610b","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T21:35:34.075Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1429,"investigation_id":"c346b0e9-500f-4078-90fe-b4647eab3df7","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"deguard","prev_score":55,"reason":"None of the nine claims checked was disputed. Five were confirmed, one was partially supported (claim_findings[3], where the 'wallet-related privacy tooling' wording is looser than the source), and three could not be verified. Two of those three (claim_findings[4] and [6]) were blocked by the source (403 and 429), so they are left out of the percentage and reflect a coverage limit, not a defect. The remaining unverifiable claim (claim_findings[8], the 2016 academic paper) was not checked, which puts the adjusted rate at 1 of 7, or about 14%, in the minor band. The review found no shutdown or material omission, but it left two high-priority coverage gaps open: on-chain analysis of the DGN token and current operating status, which DappBay's 'Inaccessible Website' flag makes relevant. Given the reviewer's moderate confidence, the penalty is set at the low end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-4,"score_limit":{"applied":-4,"limited":true,"proposed":-5,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}