Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443505315
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-08T01:56:19.593Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GFRXJLqqM3AE9Bgkd5AXJgYGghPKjMpjQLh7Zqfif61U
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1197 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-08T01:56:19.512Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"d833d196-5311-4b1f-8661-fcb59faee33f","new_score":0,"page_slug":"ai-agent-prompt-injection-crypto-attack-class-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The investigation is well-sourced for the OWASP 2026 rankings, the Blockaid H1 2026 report, the Bankr/Grok prompt injection incident (including on-chain identifiers), the Zscaler SEO poisoning research, and the OpenClaw/Lobstar Wilde incident — all confirmed from credible independent sources. The single material finding of concern is the characterization of Step Finance as an 'overpermissioned AI trading agent' incident: three primary security sources (The Record, Halborn, BleepingComputer) describe the breach exclusively as a device/key compromise with no AI agent involvement, while the AI agent framing originates solely from KuCoin's editorial blog. The summary's $45M aggregate loss figure and the page's placement of Step Finance under the AI agent attack class both inherit this disputed attribution.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}