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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Bits of Gold
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
52 → 44 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443513608
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T12:04:10.435Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
ALGXrRsnBLB4Nm21mFTdx4X1pgwSeScoEVdX63UdXP6s
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1738 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T12:04:10.044Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"f6ef462c-3310-40dd-b49b-601f0a2b73b4","new_score":44,"page_slug":"bits-of-gold","prev_score":52,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 20 of 23 claims, with 2 disputed and 1 partially supported, putting disputed_pct at 8.7% — numerically inside the approve range. However, both disputed claims (claim_findings[8], claim_findings[9]) and a high-priority coverage gap (coverage_gaps[0]) concern the same substantive problem: the Regulatory History section wrongly credits Israel's Supreme Court with a 2017 ruling that was actually issued by the Tel Aviv District Court, and overstates a 2019 Bank Leumi settlement as an industry-wide legal precedent, a framing at least one credible source contradicts and that the page's own cited article does not support since it predates the 2019 event. This is a factual misstatement about the legal basis for a regulated financial company's banking access, not a cosmetic date discrepancy, so it warrants a correction rather than a pass. At the same time, the page's central subject — the August 2026 data breach and CVE-2026-72898 — is confirmed in fine, independently corroborated detail across every claim reviewed, and the disputed material is confined entirely to one lower-severity section that can be fixed with a targeted edit. That concentration, combined with the reviewer's reasonably high confidence (0.78) and the absence of any link_rot or staleness on breach-related citations, argues against treating this as a significant or systemic failure.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}