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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
3 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
461974861
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T06:49:12.768Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T06:49:19.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T06:49:19.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
EguRkv81gNHoq53BSYSZ8mXUQSb2UD7Qy2uNW4g48SYs
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1451 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b415fab95cde9ffadf524689cd730b40","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:49:12.425Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2667,"investigation_id":"9dca8a37-94ec-492b-abc7-90a7b38b6393","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"clippy-token-clippy-microsoft-x-account-hijack","prev_score":3,"reason":"The core account of the hijack, Microsoft's confirmation, the roughly 30-minute duration, the suspended impersonator and the hedged token analysis are supported by tier-1 sources. Four of 15 claims (about 27%) are problematic. The page attributes a deleted apology to Microsoft when sources say the attackers posted it (claim_findings[3], [4], disputed). It also names spokesperson Brent Colburn, whom no cited source mentions (claim_findings[1], [2], unverifiable). The penalty sits in the upper half of the minor band because these are attribution errors about a named person and about Microsoft's own statements, and because two high-priority coverage gaps remain: no primary source for Microsoft's statement, and no on-chain analysis tying a contract to the incident.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}