Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · zkLend
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 50 → 50 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464257227
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-01T22:17:51.759Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-01T22:18:19.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-01T22:18:19.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Fe3AYD9NARnobCNEh44WQDEJrB9a1QEjXPsXbbCD3Fi2
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1479 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"d6521eb50f4ae788839179689754f23e","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T22:17:51.507Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1111,"investigation_id":"125788f2-a280-4a2b-b290-72b445456c7a","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_slug":"zklend","prev_score":50,"reason":"Of 9 claims checked, none were disputed and 1 could not be verified (claim_findings[8], the founder biographies, whose cited press release was not fetched), giving about 11%, just inside the minor band. The core account of the February 2025 exploit, the failed laundering attempts and the June 2025 shutdown was confirmed by multiple sources (claim_findings[0], [2], [3], [5]). Four claims were only partly supported: the $500,000 bounty is unconfirmed by the cited sources, the exploit section contains internal cross-page wording ('the zklend page' / 'the zklend-starknet page') instead of direct statements, one archive link points to an unrelated article, and zkLend's stated cooperation with law enforcement is missing. The omission is minor and the page already states the shutdown, so a small penalty and a revision are appropriate.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}