Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Poland SIM-Swap Crypto Theft Ring — June/July 2026
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521716
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T17:05:34.204Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AAdpmtNqibDPBdtr2ShHMSBd7isFoKVAS3iJ5M3mVMPr
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1812 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T17:05:33.860Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"560492dd-7a63-4ab3-8a6a-0176a9cef7f2","new_score":0,"page_slug":"poland-sim-swap-crypto-theft-ring-june-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core facts — the June 25, 2026 arrest of four suspects by Poland's CBZC with FBI/HSI support, the charging stage rather than an indictment or conviction, pre-trial detention, the Kraków Regional Prosecutor's Office, and the telecom-adjacent vendor attack vector — were checked directly against Poland's own police press release and hold up (claim_findings[0], [3]-[8], [21]-[22]). The page also discloses a genuine $5M-vs-$15M loss-estimate conflict between sources rather than silently picking one (claim_findings[13]-[14]), and consistently flags the ZachXBT identification of 'Wojtek Kulisz' as alleged and unconfirmed by authorities (claim_findings[16], [19]). Set against that, one claim that the alleged individual has a 'prior SIM-swap history' could not be substantiated by any source (claim_findings[20]), and the page's assertion that it covers a case 'separate' from a prior AVOID database entry on the same person could not be confirmed externally; a direct database check found two existing published entries about the same 'Wojtek Kulisz aka Merry' identity, leaving open whether this page's framing correctly distinguishes a separate case or overlaps with duplicate coverage of one person (claim_findings[28]). With zero disputed claims but this cluster of unverifiable items concentrated on an unconvicted named individual, a moderate revise — not approval, not denial — is the appropriate outcome.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}