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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443521716
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T17:05:34.204Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AAdpmtNqibDPBdtr2ShHMSBd7isFoKVAS3iJ5M3mVMPr
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1812 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T17:05:33.860Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"560492dd-7a63-4ab3-8a6a-0176a9cef7f2","new_score":0,"page_slug":"poland-sim-swap-crypto-theft-ring-june-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core facts — the June 25, 2026 arrest of four suspects by Poland's CBZC with FBI/HSI support, the charging stage rather than an indictment or conviction, pre-trial detention, the Kraków Regional Prosecutor's Office, and the telecom-adjacent vendor attack vector — were checked directly against Poland's own police press release and hold up (claim_findings[0], [3]-[8], [21]-[22]). The page also discloses a genuine $5M-vs-$15M loss-estimate conflict between sources rather than silently picking one (claim_findings[13]-[14]), and consistently flags the ZachXBT identification of 'Wojtek Kulisz' as alleged and unconfirmed by authorities (claim_findings[16], [19]). Set against that, one claim that the alleged individual has a 'prior SIM-swap history' could not be substantiated by any source (claim_findings[20]), and the page's assertion that it covers a case 'separate' from a prior AVOID database entry on the same person could not be confirmed externally; a direct database check found two existing published entries about the same 'Wojtek Kulisz aka Merry' identity, leaving open whether this page's framing correctly distinguishes a separate case or overlaps with duplicate coverage of one person (claim_findings[28]). With zero disputed claims but this cluster of unverifiable items concentrated on an unconvicted named individual, a moderate revise — not approval, not denial — is the appropriate outcome.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}