Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 12 → 12 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425396293
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:02:35.475Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2276okC3e87t2vgSaeBjCXo1ozCtfSPDbncu5gV9eRLf
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1098 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:02:34.998Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"60229d5c-8a90-4fce-8606-a33620bc4fcc","new_score":12,"page_slug":"resolv-usr-stablecoin-minting-exploit-march-2026","prev_score":12,"reason":"The investigation is substantially accurate in its core narrative: the March 22, 2026 exploit mechanism, attacker wallets, compensation plan structure, and DeFi contagion effects are well-supported by corroborating sources. Two notable factual errors exist: the second minting transaction timestamp is stated as 04:21 UTC but was 03:41 UTC per the official postmortem, and the Cisco CVE-2026-20131 patch date is stated as March 18 but NVD records show March 4. Additionally, the Fluid bad debt figure of 'more than $10 million' understates the confirmed $19.3M–$21M figure by roughly half. The Hivepro source URL returned 404. These are correctible errors rather than fundamental mischaracterizations of the event.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}