Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Blockstream Jade — Fake Firmware Phishing Campaign (August 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 5 → 0 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515734
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T18:02:56.239Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- E8g633aGBSQhHfJxzZBGwnziCwi7BMrzX6Xnfb6nkvxR
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1898 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:02:55.762Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"ebfb4383-754a-4e4e-b2ae-1dbf8c1fccd0","new_score":0,"page_slug":"blockstream-jade-fake-firmware-phishing-campaign-august-2026","prev_score":5,"reason":"Recomputing disputed_pct from the review's own claim array (2 disputed + 2 unverifiable of 23 total, not the summary's mistaken 22) gives 17.4%, placing this page in the minor-issues revision band rather than approval. The most significant defect is claim_findings[5]: the page's title and lead frame an August 2026 'second wave' of Jade-specific phishing, but the two sources cited for it never mention Blockstream or Jade at all, only a sector-wide surge tied to a different vendor's exploit — an unsourced organizing premise that the page itself later hedges with the word 'alleged' in a later section. A second flaw, claim_findings[9], is a direct self-contradiction: the page describes a 2023 incident as 'physical mail' when both its own cited source and its own timeline entry describe an email scam. Weighing against these, the review found the page's core distinction — that Blockstream was impersonated, not compromised or shipping malicious firmware — held up consistently across the entire page, corroborated by multiple verbatim-verified primary-source quotes (claim_findings[0], [1], [3], [13], [19], [21]), and the remaining discrepancies (unattributed but accurate statistics, a Secure Boot citation mismatch, and one overstated superlative) are sourcing-hygiene problems rather than active misinformation. The reviewer's coverage gaps, none marked high priority, support treating this as a fixable sourcing and internal-consistency problem rather than a fundamentally unsound page.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}