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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
5 → 0 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443515734
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T18:02:56.239Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
E8g633aGBSQhHfJxzZBGwnziCwi7BMrzX6Xnfb6nkvxR
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1898 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:02:55.762Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"ebfb4383-754a-4e4e-b2ae-1dbf8c1fccd0","new_score":0,"page_slug":"blockstream-jade-fake-firmware-phishing-campaign-august-2026","prev_score":5,"reason":"Recomputing disputed_pct from the review's own claim array (2 disputed + 2 unverifiable of 23 total, not the summary's mistaken 22) gives 17.4%, placing this page in the minor-issues revision band rather than approval. The most significant defect is claim_findings[5]: the page's title and lead frame an August 2026 'second wave' of Jade-specific phishing, but the two sources cited for it never mention Blockstream or Jade at all, only a sector-wide surge tied to a different vendor's exploit — an unsourced organizing premise that the page itself later hedges with the word 'alleged' in a later section. A second flaw, claim_findings[9], is a direct self-contradiction: the page describes a 2023 incident as 'physical mail' when both its own cited source and its own timeline entry describe an email scam. Weighing against these, the review found the page's core distinction — that Blockstream was impersonated, not compromised or shipping malicious firmware — held up consistently across the entire page, corroborated by multiple verbatim-verified primary-source quotes (claim_findings[0], [1], [3], [13], [19], [21]), and the remaining discrepancies (unattributed but accurate statistics, a Secure Boot citation mismatch, and one overstated superlative) are sourcing-hygiene problems rather than active misinformation. The reviewer's coverage gaps, none marked high priority, support treating this as a fixable sourcing and internal-consistency problem rather than a fundamentally unsound page.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}