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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_approve · Ekubo Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#14
Score
63 → 63 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
470678150
Off-chain at
2026-11-17T21:06:01.786Z
Anchored at
2026-11-17T21:06:12.000Z
Block time
2026-11-17T21:06:12.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8r29PGLzgHJr6cD5HqHih6vUL9PbQt4X3THaWGTifxYe
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1282 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"c2e72f3549f439ff516019f6b135f857","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:06:01.482Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":63,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":63,"reason":"Of 13 claim findings, none were disputed or unverifiable (0% disputed); 9 were confirmed and 4 were partially supported (claim_findings[4], [5], [7], [12]). The partial findings are wording and completeness issues: the page says the Blockworks filing lists 'multiple' gaps while Blockworks' own header says 'Partial, with 1 gap', the DAO's ownership of the Starknet contracts is stated more directly than the docs support, and the Robinhood Chain and Polygon deployments are not mentioned. The subject is still operating, the page already discloses the April and May 2026 exploits, and both omissions are minor, so no escalation applies.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":14,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}