Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:05:57.904Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"cbe21877-b631-47a7-a344-fe90e23b96f0","new_score":6,"page_slug":"bankr-bankrbot-ai-agent-prompt-injection-exploit","prev_score":18,"reason":"This page's core narrative about the May 4 prompt-injection exploit -- the Morse-code trigger, the NFT-based permission escalation, the stolen amount, and Bankr's remediation -- is solidly corroborated (16 of 25 checked claims fully confirmed, including the remediation steps in claim_findings[17] and [18]). The main problem is claim_findings[14]: the page states the second, May 19-20 breach of 14 wallets used 'the same underlying permission-chain vulnerability' as the first incident, but a directly-fetched contemporaneous source describes that breach as distinct and likely caused by private-key or session compromise, not a repeat of the NFT/Morse-code mechanism. That same issue is independently flagged as a high-priority coverage gap, reinforcing that it's a real interpretive overreach rather than a minor slip. Two smaller defects -- an inflated 15-20% price-decline figure versus a more commonly reported ~40% (claim_findings[6]) and a real quote misattributed to the wrong citations (claim_findings[13]) -- round out the issues, while two link-rot findings were correctly excluded from the disputed count and don't affect factual accuracy.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}