Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443517748
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:29:22.885Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6DR891cE7hSbd1UMJAFetRPH2RbEt28axLQ9C1uayi2G
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1297 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:29:22.782Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"7a46b309-a70d-44be-a0f7-6d3b9d0c2347","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mica-post-deadline-crypto-firm-impersonation-scam-cluster-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core factual scaffolding — the MiCA deadline mechanics, authorization counts, Binance's non-authorization, and the ESMA/AMF impersonation advisories with their direct quotes — is well corroborated by independent tier-1 and tier-2 sources, and all named legitimate firms (ESMA, AMF, AFM, FSMA, Coinbase, Kraken, OKX, Standard Chartered, Binance) are consistently and correctly framed as victims, examples of compliance, or neutral market facts rather than as wrongdoers. The main weakness is a recurring overstatement of the Dutch AFM's and Belgium's FSMA's specific role in confirming the impersonation pattern (their contemporaneous warnings were narrower or differently scoped than ESMA's and AMF's), plus two instances where a cited source (Crowdfund Insider) does not actually contain the figure attributed to it, even though the figures are independently corroborated elsewhere.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}