Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Balance Coin (BLC) Oracle Manipulation / 42DAO
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 4 → 4 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443522788
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T02:06:26.313Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3Md178ELM8TAorZJPD7mZkyUsm1AAnFsh3fVUmhRBJtX
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1597 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T02:06:25.871Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"f7e8927f-c246-405f-843b-763fbb6ec79e","new_score":4,"page_slug":"balance-coin-blc-oracle-manipulation-42dao","prev_score":4,"reason":"Independent fact-checking confirmed 22 of 25 claims on this page, with 2 partially supported and 1 unverifiable, for a disputed rate of 4% (well inside the approve range; there were zero outright disputed claims). The page's core narrative — the July 22, 2026 date, the $912K-$915K loss, the Spotter/GemJoin/Dog oracle-manipulation mechanism, the two-stage replay attack, and the CertiK audit history — is corroborated by sources beyond the page's own citations (claim_findings[1], [10], [11], [15], [16]). The page also correctly identifies 42DAO as the victim rather than the perpetrator and correctly treats the exploit-versus-rug-pull question as unresolved, both independently verified (claim_findings[0], [23]). Three coverage gaps were flagged as high priority, but none describe an error in this page's own text: two are expansion suggestions (adding primary on-chain transaction evidence; correcting a mis-pointed archive link on one citation whose live source remains valid), and the third reports that a separate, already-approved page appears to misstate this incident's root cause as a key-management failure rather than the oracle/logic flaw documented here — a defect in that other page, not this one.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}