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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#5
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457583757
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T09:15:04.628Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T09:15:18.686Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9MPuTY1PaHweZQizcB1UAgZ6vtFjAUDy1DbZfK6gjcvq
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2095 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"82026e06ef0894b5138653af5c8aa788","decided_at":"2026-10-16T09:15:04.408Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0909,"findings_hash":"3YN6Pma96a7YinaFugFssnE5Sezorz25Vo1pFmemL9Ux","investigation_id":"26dc07e2-5780-4704-aa90-143adfe70acb","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"86e3420e5e9285dddab1e22ee868e135ee6a3b8589b61aa448e2ceb78957f0de","page_slug":"solidity-pro-vscode-extension-malicious","prev_score":0,"reason":"The large majority of this page's technical claims -- publisher/extension IDs, version evolution, C2 infrastructure fragments, exfiltration channels, SHA-256 hashes, and the broad attribution and timeline narrative -- are well supported by direct retrieval of the cited Yeeth Security, The Hacker News, CryptoTimes/SlowMist, and Meyka sources, and corroborated by independent search results for the WhiteCobra/Koi Security reporting. Two defects stand out: a fabricated-looking 'revenue targets of $10,000 to $500,000 per hour' figure attributed to a leaked deployment-plan document, which does not appear in any of the four sources cited for that claim (including the Yeeth Security article that is the apparent origin of the rest of the deployment-plan description); and a clear misattribution in the Affected Versions section, where the clean 'decoy' releases at v1.0.0/v4.0.0 are assigned to the helper-beeps publisher when the cited source attributes them to web3devtoolsx (and separately documents helper-beeps' own v1.0.0 as part of the malicious early-dropper phase, not a decoy). A secondary, lower-severity issue is the Malpedia attribution sentence, which implies Malpedia affirmatively states no state attribution exists, when the Malpedia page is simply silent on the topic. No accepted community submissions exist for this page, so evidence_review is empty; this is not itself a defect given the page is built entirely from AI-gathered open-source reporting.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}