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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
13 → 13 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457579930
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T09:01:27.705Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T09:01:38.327Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
7TTZmarg6K4bFgUCLF2ta2K4wCYnBRE2XEwWyGNGge55
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2085 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"1002d185934a6303d89dafc51c2a87a7","decided_at":"2026-10-16T09:01:27.484Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1304,"findings_hash":"AXGte2cW6y1Hf43svK6y2zqJqoDooYEU5KRXzFePfMZe","investigation_id":"fa3e4739-2493-471f-b16a-4a0503f66079","mode":"findings_only","new_score":13,"page_content_hash":"d57a2db786d5e008b360c5d1f27819c95230a56caee4a25f154ca5d19df40a48","page_slug":"coinkite-coldcard","prev_score":13,"reason":"The page's core narrative — the March 2021 libngu/Yasmarang RNG regression in Coldcard firmware 4.0.0, its July 2026 exploitation across multiple waves totaling roughly $116-130M from 5,200+ addresses, Coinkite's emergency patches and data-retention suspension, the O'Beirne prior-warning account, and the Peter Gray/'switck' GPG-signature allegation — is well-supported by primary and credible secondary sources, including Coinkite's own firmware changelog and the TRM Labs report. Figures that vary across outlets (Fortune's $116M vs. CBC/Galaxy's up to $155M) are accurately presented as time-stamped snapshots of an evolving investigation rather than a single disputed number. The most substantive problems found: (1) the section heading's 'CVE:' label implies a formal CVE identifier that no source confirms exists; (2) the claim that North Korea was 'specifically noted as unlikely' overstates what TRM Labs actually said (a laundering-pattern contrast, not an affirmative exculpation); (3) a quote attributed to Kraken's CSO is partly the source article's paraphrase rather than a verbatim statement; (4) one cited source (Fieldfisher) is inaccessible both live and via archive, leaving an unverifiable quote about recovery obstacles; and (5) the 40/72-bit entropy figures are presented as settled when independent technical sources differ. None of these rise to fabrication; they are precision and attribution issues layered on an otherwise solid, well-hedged investigation.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}