Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457749337
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T19:11:25.479Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T19:11:53.013Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5SeXqVFJhGct7BC7eub9RdZYATrnyezqgmBoZcHU68uB
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1883 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2f54a724c1af0312726e80f683fa677e","decided_at":"2026-10-16T19:11:25.099Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4118,"findings_hash":"52bLxc18x8tYNruigWLKw4Y4uStvV8SNXVu2MCfsrf6c","investigation_id":"66c63ff3-4d66-4fac-81e6-e753ddf53383","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"3610bcf9b6220478991d6c60f9daa7946e7f83fb1ba29b0483be6bb62bf7d28a","page_slug":"91m-bitcoin-social-engineering-theft-hardware-wallet-impersonation-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative is well supported: the $91M August 2025 theft, the $243M August 2024 Genesis creditor precedent, the $282M January 2026 escalation, and the Coldcard firmware exploit are all independently corroborated by the cited tier-1/tier-2 sources, and the central Bitcoin address and transaction hash for the $91M theft were verified directly on-chain. However, several specific details do not hold up: a quote attributed to CoinDesk ('largest individual social engineering theft') does not appear in the cited CoinDesk article; the Coldcard Wave 1 address count (500) contradicts the page's own cited Fortune source (1,196); the Proofpoint phishing campaign is misquoted as a 'hardware audit' when the actual email said 'security audit' (repeated identically in both prose and timeline); the 'At least 15 independent attackers' figure is not supported by any source found, including the ones cited; and the Legal Proceedings section is stale, describing Malone Lam's case as being in unresolved plea negotiations as of 'early 2026' when he in fact pleaded guilty on September 8, 2026. None of these affect the fundamental facts of the theft itself, but they are real, fixable sourcing and currency errors.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}