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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
30 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443521294
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T14:19:29.887Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BmhNXGWJhfZ5y7LEMnu42Yywi6FHGsBB7ABXBdC24iA
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1876 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T14:19:29.435Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"3c1969e1-ee54-409a-a92b-1b829b3d76c6","new_score":0,"page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack","prev_score":3,"reason":"This page's central narrative — the July 6, 2026 $20 million BonkDAO treasury drain via a $4.4 million quorum-buying attack on proposal BIP-76, the seven-wallet vote with 99.9% approval on 2.9% turnout, and the 'governance design flaw, not a code bug' framing — is well corroborated by independent sources (21 of 28 claims confirmed). However, the review found that the page's own cited source directly contradicts its claim that this was 'the most significant governance-attack-as-exploit in Solana DAO history' (claim_findings[2]), and the stated price decline is internally inconsistent with the page's own arithmetic and appears to blend an hours-scale move with a later, multi-day cumulative decline (claim_findings[16]). A security firm is also credited with a three-part causal finding it only partly made (claim_findings[13]), and dollar figures describing how the stolen funds moved are individually accurate but arranged so as to imply they sum to the total drained when in fact they exceed it (claim_findings[10], [12]). Separately, this page is a near-duplicate of another live AVOID investigation covering the same event, and the two disagree on the size and timing of the price crash and on whether a loan helped finance the attack — a consistency problem for readers that the review flags as its top-priority coverage gap, alongside under-covered items including a named public dispute over the incident's legal characterization and missing follow-up on recovery and attribution efforts.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}