Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443517889
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:39:18.842Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- J9yHSmEs27ubbsWJUQEddPWFsJotJGX4vQ1Ud8Kw3DJ7
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1285 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:39:18.561Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's factual core -- the account-takeover mechanism, malicious package/timeline details, technical payload behavior, scale, and remediation -- is well corroborated across independent vendor sources and Mastra's own incident report, and it correctly frames Mastra and its maintainers as victims of a credential-theft compromise rather than as wrongdoers. The principal defect found is in the opposite direction from typical overclaiming: the Threat Actor Attribution section materially understates the confidence of the page's own highest-credibility cited source (Microsoft), which explicitly attributed this specific incident to Sapphire Sleet with high confidence, while the page instead frames attribution as an unconfirmed pattern overlap. A secondary, minor issue is an unsupported editorial claim tying Mastra's user base to DeFi/blockchain infrastructure that is not present in any cited source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}