Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Lazarus Group Mach-O Man ClickFix macOS Campaign
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443562318
- Off-chain at
- 2026-09-02T00:42:01.600Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FhuGrZYpnaZZR9PL6bobCTh3GCriPHjpxUeZZ9i47Vi8
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1784 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"be4ff1d2cd2e0c1e0eec814989ab79ca","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-09-02T00:42:01.377Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1765,"investigation_id":"5caaf7ce-4d97-4ee9-bd46-ceeaa5d70a7d","new_score":0,"page_slug":"lazarus-group-mach-o-man-clickfix-macos-campaign","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core technical claims hold up well: the malware hashes, five-stage attack chain, C2 infrastructure, persistence mechanism, exfiltration path, and the Lazarus/Chollima attribution are all confirmed against the primary ANY.RUN source and corroborated by independent outlets (claim_findings[2]-[10], [12]). However, the review found the page overstates the disclosure timeline and misattributes the origin of the 'North Korea's Safari' name: the malware was actually first named and detailed with indicators on April 13, 2026 by the same primary researcher, eight days before the date the page presents as the first disclosure, and 'North Korea's Safari' is that researcher's own recurring report title rather than a name SOC Prime coined for a separate related campaign (claim_findings[0], [1]). The MITRE ATT&CK technique list also includes two IDs not found in either cited source while omitting a directly relevant exfiltration technique, and one code-string artifact was transcribed incorrectly (claim_findings[10], [13]). At 18% disputed, none of the errors touch the central attribution or technical severity of the campaign, but a high-priority coverage gap on the disclosure/provenance issue warrants correction before the page is treated as fully settled.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}