Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Remora Markets
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 28 → 28 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443520631
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T11:41:49.270Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 552zzZ2fmmTJRRPTzf59Ro6Mq7ZAjWSHAkD3HtCFZtmj
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1102 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:41:49.127Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"a587cbef-2ae8-42d1-9ea1-e6c1492fa99f","new_score":28,"page_slug":"remora-markets","prev_score":28,"reason":"Remora Markets' core identity, its acquisition history, and the Step Finance hack/shutdown timeline are well-corroborated by multiple tier-1 and tier-2 outlets and are not the product of entity confusion. The main defects are a timeline entry mixing a wrong date, an unsupported $110M revenue figure, and a year-over-year/year-to-date mischaracterization all traced to one source; an unsupported $14M 'other incidents' figure; an overstated 24-hour STEP token collapse range; and an unaddressed conflict between the page's redemption-uncertainty framing and one of its own cited sources describing Remora as having already reimbursed holders. Several risk-framing claims in sections 4-5 are the page's own analytical inference rather than sourced fact.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}