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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-14)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443515380
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T17:04:35.360Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
FJi4x56MQhoDntqxK7Uez3juFjX9XPw1TwJ2WmGb7kda
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2545 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T17:04:34.915Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6a80ffa9-764c-4d6c-819b-2534f22d1540","new_score":0,"page_slug":"july-2026-bridge-hack-wave-three-protocols-35-6m-one-day","prev_score":0,"reason":"Using the reviewer's authoritative claim_findings array (32 entries: 23 confirmed, 5 partially_supported, 4 disputed, 0 unverifiable), disputed_pct is 12.5%, placing this page in the low end of the minor-issues band. The core per-incident facts — dollar amounts, dates, attack mechanics, and fund flows for AFX Trade, Verus, and B-Squared — are well-corroborated across multiple independent outlets, and the headline $35.6M figure does arithmetically reconcile with the three per-incident totals (claim_findings[1]). The page also correctly avoids blaming the underlying chains (Arbitrum, Ethereum, BNB) for what were bridge- or contract-specific failures, and its dedicated 'coordination' section properly discloses that no security firm has linked the three incidents to a single actor. However, three distinct sourcing defects push the page above a clean approval: it attributes the catchy 'Hackers Day' label specifically to Blockaid when no source supports that specific attribution (claim_findings[4]); it asserts, in both a narrative section and the timeline, that Verus knowingly redeposited ~$11.58M into an unpatched bridge on July 8 — a claim its own cited source does not contain and that is otherwise sourced only to an uncited opinion blog (claim_findings[13], [26]); and it states H1 2026 set records for both incident count and aggregate dollar losses, when its own cited sources (Blockaid, TRM Labs) explicitly say losses were lower than the prior year and only the incident count was a record (claim_findings[3]). Separately, the page's own title and entity_name ('Bridge Hack Wave — Three Protocols') mischaracterize B-Squared, which independent reporting describes as a staking-contract exploit rather than a bridge hack (claim_findings[32], flagged as a high-priority coverage gap) — a defect in the page's core framing that isn't captured in the disputed count. Together these issues do not undermine the page's substance but they materially affect the story's framing (an invented 'known reckless redeposit' narrative about Verus, an inflated H1 record claim, and a mislabeled title), warranting revision rather than approval.","score_delta":-14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}