Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 2 → 2 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443517132
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T19:47:48.457Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ASTLwAD3YZKLfrwsYZNQDxA5AxUSDqTxxASabtGqNNCB
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1172 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T19:47:48.340Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"7638801f-7416-48e4-9f83-f287e3cb78d9","new_score":2,"page_slug":"wel1dropper-800-malicious-npm-packages-rat-and-crypto-infostealer-campaign-august-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"The page's core technical narrative (WEL1DROPPER mechanics, package counts, Moika campaign details, Aeza sanctions history, and the FAMOUS CHOLLIMA/jpeek895 attribution) is well corroborated by primary sources including Sonatype, The Hacker News, OpenSourceMalware, and SafeDep. However, two claims that materially affect the entity's risk profile — the Aeza Group C2 link and the cryptocurrency drain routine — trace back only to a single lower-tier aggregator rather than the primary research the page also cites, and the timeline contains a factual date error (April 1 vs. the sourced May 27 Moika start date) that overstates the campaign's duration. A cited SecurityWeek article in the North Korean campaign section describes an unrelated incident.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}