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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
3535 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
423223278
Off-chain at
2026-05-30T19:50:37.625Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
GneNGem39JN5BAC1ydxD9SrjSXF5cg459TKyXKhM1uzs
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1487 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-05-30T19:50:37.523Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"4bd7b8fb-8444-4e3e-98d1-702adadd3e86","new_score":35,"page_slug":"tac-protocol-bridge","prev_score":35,"reason":"The page's core factual narrative is well-supported: the May 12 exploit, $2.86M amount, affected assets (USDT/BLUM/tsTON), sequencer validation vulnerability, 10% white-hat bounty, 90% fund recovery, and bridge pause are all confirmed by multiple independent sources. The primary disputed finding is the all-time high price figure (~$0.028), which conflicts with CoinMarketCap's recorded ATH of $0.04254, making the derived 25-32% post-exploit drawdown calculation inaccurate under the most widely-used data source. Several claims are only partially supported due to single-source attribution (the 13 ETH + 300 ZEC bounty breakdown from MEXC alone) or editorial over-specification of technical details (code-hash/minter checks) that cited sources do not confirm. The PeckShield $328.6M figure is also mischaracterized as May-only losses rather than 2026 year-to-date cumulative losses. Two primary cited URLs (The Block, Blockworks) returned 403 and could not be directly verified. Critical coverage gaps include absence of on-chain evidence and reliance on exchange news aggregators rather than TAC's own primary-source disclosure.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}