Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Blend Pools V2
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 58 → 58 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464345590
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T03:33:39.764Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T03:33:51.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T03:33:51.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DS8x1AsoiM2m44BTBgFxf2zzJYnZ4KeN2djwKHf6SK6C
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1480 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"3b3ef4e79b7cc09cf19f287c2bda4cf3","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T03:33:39.713Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3636,"findings_hash":"AX2AzdEHn5LnXqu1g1Lbx19Th8zd54dzWae1hpBwACB7","investigation_id":"6e06c76c-9637-4555-a3e5-8c1d3c736ea5","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":58,"omissions":{"material":1,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"0686de2749975cd336b232c3bceae3eeb75244ebd78f3cfcf9668c6acc4a945f","page_slug":"blend-pools-v2","prev_score":58,"reason":"The core exploit narrative is well supported. The mechanism, amounts, price manipulation, 48M XLM freeze, bounty and BlockSec's conclusion match independent sources. The exploit date is wrong in two places: the page says Feb 23 but sources show Feb 22, 2026 UTC. The 'before the attacker could complete the bridge' wording overstates the freeze. The $3.6M net-loss figure is derived and not sourced. The Certora audit predates V2, so it does not establish a 'clean' V2 posture. The page omits Script3's pledge to compensate depositors. I did not verify the TVL, tokenomics and team claims.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}