Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457548843
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T07:09:29.339Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T07:09:48.545Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2VAebqRWAFwEdqx139k3GwYFXZSGeHfpSzDcsHYTFMvZ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2277 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"21833fc2ed1dd0f2903c74ff843d6000","decided_at":"2026-10-16T07:09:28.952Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2381,"findings_hash":"eDPkWCgms5qQpEosRqv7BpBdgjwRjQjFvfSZB2YnZvk","investigation_id":"ebfb4383-754a-4e4e-b2ae-1dbf8c1fccd0","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"df96e1b3220499d4143f2b87f094ea729fa13641c2302b71d45a4d014391031c","page_slug":"blockstream-jade-fake-firmware-phishing-campaign-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core, well-sourced claims hold up: the September 12, 2025 Blockstream X alert and its quoted language, the Jimmy Song attribution, the getbento.com/'Adelphia Restaurant' phishing indicators, the October 2023 shipping-provider data-exposure finding, the DARKNAVY disclosure and firmware 1.0.38 fix, and the Coldcard Mk3 exploit figures (1,816 BTC / $116M / 5,200+ addresses / 40-bit entropy) are all confirmed against the cited or findable primary and secondary sources. The most significant problem is the page's central claim of a 'documented' second, Jade-specific phishing wave in August 2026: every August 2026 source actually consulted (Decrypt, Crypto Economy, Cryptonews.net) covers a sector-wide surge naming Coldcard, Foundation, and Trezor, not Blockstream, making this claim disputed/overstated in three places (summary, Campaign Overview, Broader Context) that should be treated as one defect. A second clear internal contradiction exists between section 'Attack Vector and Tactics,' which says the October 2023 incident used physical mail, and the page's own timeline entry for the same incident, which correctly says it used email — the cited U.Today source confirms email. The 'zero exploits through genuine update channels' quote and the $3.1 billion H1 2025 total could not be traced to a primary Blockstream statement or an actual tracker report, respectively, and should be softened or re-sourced. Two sources_used entries (CoinCentral and U.Today) carry archive_url snapshots of completely unrelated articles, a metadata defect independent of the live URLs, which still resolve and support their claims.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}