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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
10 → 0 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462055369
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T11:34:30.256Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T11:34:41.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T11:34:41.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
E9v7fpj1A4ap9d85J2ebrUr58gLAiyHmSbEnKWjPUqD
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2102 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"178fafd05121d7b22b93b15fedb8523b","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T11:34:29.700Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3333,"investigation_id":"7765bf42-3a60-4115-9b3d-61f5bf49a1ce","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"dcent-app-wallet-exploit-september-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"Three of nine checked claims (33%) were disputed or could not be verified. claim_findings[0] is a self-contradictory timeline entry about version 8.1.0, and claim_findings[3] lists law enforcement action as unconfirmed although DCENT's own report says it reported to Korean authorities on Sept 16. claim_findings[2] (the 'Check if action is needed' label) could not be found in the sources. Separately, the page omits material later developments: reporting through Sept 25 shows about 12.4M XRP stolen over roughly 10 days and laundering through THORChain, so its 9.3M XRP and Sept 15-16 figures are out of date (claim_findings[4], omission_findings[0] and [1]). The core incident account and the on-chain wave timeline were confirmed (claim_findings[6]), and four archive links point to unrelated pages (claim_findings[8]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"score_limit":{"applied":-10,"limited":true,"proposed":-22,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports material omissions (thefts continued through Sept 25 for about 12.4M XRP from 7,393 wallets; about 6.3M XRP laundered via THORChain to exchanges) and subject_status.contradicts_page is true. The page's loss and date scope is out of date. The band is held at significant, not deny, because the core incident facts are confirmed and the page already calls the investigation ongoing."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}