Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · DAO Maker Vesting
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 40 → 40 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457845907
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T00:59:39.793Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T00:59:52.883Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6MUDKhP1XLrn3D3KAUGG7u5h8v14MBJr9Rd86TpVjXmH
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2145 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"92c43757574a529d33f64aa68d49ee9d","decided_at":"2026-10-17T00:59:39.602Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2,"findings_hash":"9nZSDfpduQpmuoDg4U7Pag2NZpEMqmTnqzV8orXZriiY","investigation_id":"d8c26836-fed6-47ab-a999-8ba0da02fedf","mode":"findings_only","new_score":40,"page_content_hash":"8a994cd65ad978275e63d629888bd05360f2dc9b925fff2f3e3fdbf11dfd5cac","page_slug":"dao-maker-vesting","prev_score":40,"reason":"The core narrative -- two 2021 exploits (an admin-key-compromise USDC theft in August and an unauthenticated init() vesting-contract exploit in September), subsequent Tornado Cash laundering, and years of unfulfilled USDR compensation amid allegations of governance manipulation -- is well supported by multiple independent, credible outlets (Decrypt, Newsweek, CoinDesk, The Block, Cointelegraph, rekt.news, crowdfundinsider) and holds up under independent verification. However, the page contains one serious, specific error: the four on-chain contract addresses given for the CAPS/CPD/DERC/SHO tokens stolen in the September exploit do not match any address reported by the cited SlowMist/crowdfundinsider analysis, suggesting fabricated technical detail attached to an otherwise-accurate figure. The claim that DAO Maker has 'raised hundreds of millions of dollars' is also unsupported and contradicted by the best available total-raised figures (~$90-107 million). A cited source (quadrigainitiative.com) is miscited to support the September exploit despite only covering the unrelated August incident, one URL (cryptointelligence.co.uk) is dead across three citation points, and the October 2025 DAO Maker-XDC Network partnership claim could not be corroborated anywhere despite extensive searching. The governance-vote outcome is described more starkly ('suspend'/'cancel') than the page's own most recent cited source actually documents (a 50%-of-par option that itself went unpaid), though the practical result for victims was the same.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}