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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
71 → 71 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462184719
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T19:12:40.976Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T19:13:08.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T19:13:08.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
FygsHn2ejXCxo88rG26jKtnKJVXZQRf6zCrb2V8g1r7e
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2565 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"bfd14ffa31d968b46fdebd6c53fe36bd","band_override":{"actual_delta":-5,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0,"expected_delta_range":[0,0],"expected_verdict":"review_approve","rationale":"No claim was disputed. Of 10 claim findings, 3 could not be checked because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[3], [7], [9]) and are left out of the percentage; the other 7 were 4 confirmed and 3 partially supported, so the disputed share is 0%. The verdict moves from approve to a minor revision because of two high-priority coverage gaps: the page stops at October 1 while the review ran on October 27, and the key figures (31-minute window, source address, alias handles, activation block height) rest on sources the reviewer could not read. Smaller issues are the 'final' $387.5M figure that a later Bitget update may supersede (claim_findings[0]), an overstated 'not publicly detailed' about Elliptic (claim_findings[8]), and two archive links that point to unrelated articles. No shutdown, sanction or material omission was reported."},"blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:12:40.690Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"27995d3d-bbc0-4136-a46a-dc9c09762ae7","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":71,"page_slug":"zcash-ironwood-shielded-pool-dprk-laundering-vector","prev_score":71,"reason":"No claim was disputed. Of 10 claim findings, 3 could not be checked because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[3], [7], [9]) and are left out of the percentage; the other 7 were 4 confirmed and 3 partially supported, so the disputed share is 0%. The verdict moves from approve to a minor revision because of two high-priority coverage gaps: the page stops at October 1 while the review ran on October 27, and the key figures (31-minute window, source address, alias handles, activation block height) rest on sources the reviewer could not read. Smaller issues are the 'final' $387.5M figure that a later Bitget update may supersede (claim_findings[0]), an overstated 'not publicly detailed' about Elliptic (claim_findings[8]), and two archive links that point to unrelated articles. No shutdown, sanction or material omission was reported.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}