Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Sky (MakerDAO)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 58 → 51 (-7)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425207325
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-08T23:09:23.564Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FYfKknABc3sWX1ehNmTsZZJdhK9ccQNGyyKwa9iom14E
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1512 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-08T23:09:22.998Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a19f2993-f03b-4b55-ba33-7f77dadac14c","new_score":51,"page_slug":"sky-makerdao","prev_score":58,"reason":"The page is broadly accurate and well-sourced with no outright false claims and no link rot. However, claim_findings[21] (USDS freeze function) materially overstates the deployment — Rune Christensen publicly clarified the freeze capability was not active at launch, only an upgrade path, which inverts the risk framing presented. Additionally, claim_findings[10] places the Black Thursday bad debt at $6.65M DAI, a figure that conflicts with primary sources citing $2.5M–$4.5M depending on methodology. The timeline entry for the DSChief vulnerability (claim_findings[33]) is dated April 1, 2019 but the OpenZeppelin disclosure places discovery at April 22–26, 2019. Two high-priority coverage gaps — on-chain governance analytics and current protocol financial health including RWA/T-bill composition — limit the page's usefulness for current risk assessment. The dismissed class action characterization (claim_findings[12]) omits that the dismissal allowed amendment and refiling, leaving legal status incomplete. These issues collectively warrant revision rather than approval, though no change to publication status or investigation standing is required.","score_delta":-7,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}