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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · CBEX (CryptoBridge Exchange)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462052143
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T11:22:35.696Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T11:23:11.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T11:23:11.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
86GQy8pCaauRJY29uqcmSaHNwNAf5CYRhd1sgVFeJy13
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1880 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2aeefef4f77230531896e90be5bd8d72","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T11:22:35.217Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"4da399d3-d15c-481e-a37e-dda4e4d30282","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"cbex-cryptobridge-exchange","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 8 claims checked, 1 (12.5%) could not be verified: the figure of more than 600,000 investors attributed to the EFCC (claim_findings[1]) appears in none of the sources checked. Three more claims were only partly supported: the SFC alert names Japan and Canada but not Hong Kong (claim_findings[2]), the wanted list was later revised (claim_findings[6]), and the case status is more than a year out of date (claim_findings[7]). The central claims, including the NFIU loss estimate, Elliptic's October 2024 laundering finding, the EFCC consultancy-certificate point and the 7 July 2025 arraignment details, match their sources. The page also leaves out the EFCC's May 2025 retraction of a wrongly named suspect and has a high-priority gap on court proceedings after July 2025, so a small penalty and a correction are warranted.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The material omission (EFCC's May 2025 removal of Ellie Bitar from the wanted list) concerns a person the page does not name, and the page's core allegations are confirmed. The 12.5% minor band already reflects the issue and the omission is handled by a correction. The subject status (shut down) matches the page."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}