Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 8 → 8 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506506
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-10T14:49:19.202Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CV7SRu3pVJGsztafY8fkLywTpjNancVNtw1SBubPozEM
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1257 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-10T14:49:19.125Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"d96ffb36-224d-4516-b961-712c58daad2c","new_score":8,"page_slug":"verus-ethereum-bridge-second-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"The page's central narrative — a second Verus-Ethereum Bridge exploit on July 23, 2026 reusing an unpatched vulnerability from a May 18, 2026 incident, following a July 8, 2026 redeposit of recovered funds — is well-corroborated across multiple independent outlets and Blockaid's own disclosures, including specific on-chain identifiers (tx hash, wallet addresses) and technical root-cause details (checkCCEValues, submitImports). The main issues found are a one-day date error in the timeline (May 17 vs. the correct May 18 for the first exploit's detection, which contradicts the page's own summary text), an unattributed editorial characterization of the redeposit decision as a 'governance failure' identified 'by analysts,' and an unsupported superlative claim about the Verus incidents being the 'largest two-incident cumulative loss on a single bridge contract in 2026.'","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}