Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443520250
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T11:09:22.064Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- C48X1ABffcyHLXkryxLaJuczBSwaRwZdrW4VGJJvSn5P
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1712 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:09:21.864Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"dd4506df-f53a-4fb4-8a37-e2a89d110810","new_score":0,"page_slug":"famous-chollima-clickfake-interview-campaign-pylangghost-golangghost","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 52 checked claims, 5 were disputed and 2 unverifiable, putting the disputed rate at about 13% -- within the range that calls for revision rather than approval or denial. The page's core narrative (Famous Chollima's attribution, the ClickFix mechanic, and the technical profiles of PylangGhost and GolangGhost) holds up well against primary vendor reporting. The most consequential problem is that the page describes BlueNoroff/APT38 as a sub-cluster of Famous Chollima when independent sources treat them as a separate, parallel North Korean hacking group (claim_findings[7]) -- an attribution error worth correcting given how often this specific mix-up recurs across similar pages. The page also repeats an off-by-one error, saying the FBI published 52 stolen-fund wallet addresses when the FBI's own notice lists 51 (claim_findings[35], [45]), and cites the wrong sources for two accurate but uncited details (Nuitka malware compilation and GolangGhost's first documentation). Separately, the review's single high-priority coverage gap is that the page discusses this campaign alongside the $1.5 billion Bybit heist and DPRK's 2025 theft totals without noting those figures belong to a different, separately tracked group, which could leave readers overestimating this campaign's own financial toll.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}